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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-30)(Rep. Vol. 9 2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Appellants fail to marshal the evidence? A party who challenges must 
"marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the findings and 
demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Investment Company, 818 P.2d 1311,1312, citing, Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 
(Utah App. 1989). In West Valley City, the Court held, "after marshaling the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, the City must then show that these same findings 
are ;so lacking in support as to be' w against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus 
making them clearly erroneous." 818 P.2d 1311, 1315, citing Mountain States 
Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
Therefore the standard of appellate review is "clearly erroneous". 
2. The Court did not err in imposing a constructive trust. On appeal from a 
bench trial, "findings of fact. . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a): Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P.3d 332. There 
was sufficient evidence presented below to warrant the imposition of a constructive 
trust. In Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983) the court 
stated "It is axiomatic that an essential element of any agreement is the intention' to 
create it. Accordingly, those constructive trusts which may arise without proof of the 
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parties5 intention5 to create a trust cannot and do not require. . . that some form of 
agreement be manifested." In §160 of the Restatement of Restitution the broadest 
application of a constructive trust is presented. "It provides that a constructive trust may 
arise 'where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey 
it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to 
retain it. . . ." Id. Equity Jurisprudence §1044, written by J. Pomeroy, states, 
"Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust is raised by the doctrines 
of equity for the purpose of working out justice in the most efficient manner, where 
there is no intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in most cases contrary to 
the intention of the one holding the legal title, and where there is no express or implied, 
written or verbal, declaration of the trust.55 Id. To reverse findings of fact of a trial 
court, the standard of appellate review is "clearly erroneous55). 
3. The Court did not err in finding that the claim for a constructive trust was 
not barred by the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitation^ are questions of law. 
"Statutes of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action.55 Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 33 citing, Burkholz v. 
Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utah 1998) "In certain instances, however, the discovery 
rule tolls the limitation period until facts forming the basis f^ r the cause of action are 
discovered. Id. 914 P.2d at 50-51.55 There are situations where the discovery rule 
applies: 
(1) In situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) 
in situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
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because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in 
situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of 
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of 
action. 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (footnote 
citations omitted). 
The standard of appellate review as to whether or not a statute of limitations 
has expired is a question of law reviewed for correctness giving no particular 
deference for correctness. The standard of appellate review of the trial court's 
findings of fact as to the discovery rule and the following of the limitation period 
is "clearly erroneous". 
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions. 
Concerning the imposed sanctions arising from the Appellants' failure to mediate in good 
faith, the Appellant's brief does not even state what the sanctions were or why they were 
imposed other than bad faith. In Woodward v. Fazzio 823 P.2d 474, (UT 1991), the court 
was deciding whether a father had abandoned his child. It found that findings of facts as 
"conclusory statements provide no insight into the evidentiary basis for the trial court's 
decision and render effective appellate review unfeasible." Under Rule 101 (h), Utah 
Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution the court may order absent 
parties to show cause why they failed to attend the mediation conference and, if 
appropriate, why sanctions should not be imposed. The standard of appellate review is 
abuse of discretion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS^ 
The order of the Court below which is the subject of this appeal is the imposition 
of a constructive trust upon real property in favor of Arnold Dwayne Rawlings 
("Dwayne"), Theron LaRell Rawlings ("LaRell"), Bryce C. fcawlings ("Bryce"), and 
Carol Lynn R. Masterson ("Carol"), (collectively known as the third party plaintiffs). In 
1967, shortly after their father, Arnold J. Rawlings ("Arnold"), was diagnosed with 
cancer, Arnold conveyed the approximate seven (7) acre family farm property ("trust 
property"), in trust to Donald Rawlings ("Donald"), and his wife Jeanette Rawlings 
("Jeanette"), for the benefit of Arnold's wife, Cleo Rawlings ("Cleo"), and all five of 
their children, including the third party plaintiffs. 
From March 12, 2007, to March 15, 2007, a bench tri|al was held. On August 24, 
2007, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusionsiof Law and its Judgment on 
Issue of Constructive Trust ("Order"), certifying its order as a final judgment, pursuant to 
the provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant filed a 
Notice of Appeal on September 4, 2007. 
Arnold Rawlings acquired the family farm from Arnold's parents in 1942. Cleo, 
had no ownership interest in the trust property. The couple had five children, Donald, 
Dwayne, Carol, Bryce, and LaRell. When the children were living at home with Arnold 
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and Cleo, the trust property was owned and operated as a family farm, with each of 
Arnold and Cleo's children helping with the work. 
In October of 1966, Arnold was diagnosed with cancer. Arnold did not have 
insurance nor the money necessary to treat his cancer. On December 22, 1966, Arnold 
was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, following which he began a series of 
20 cobalt treatments. The medical attention Arnold required was extremely expensive. 
Because of Arnold's lack of resources he received welfare assistance to pay for his 
treatment. Donald had been in correspondence with the Utah County Department of 
Public Welfare and had a letter stating that the Utah County Department of Public 
Welfare would pay the majority of the medical expenses if Arnold's property ("the trust 
property"), was not in his name. In February and again in March of 1967, Arnold had 
more medical treatment. Arnold's health was poor. He was still concerned about losing 
the trust property. 
On March 24, 1967, Arnold and Cleo executed a Warranty Deed conveying the 
trust property to Donald and Jeanette, their oldest son and his wife. Cleo also signed 
although she had no ownership interest in the Trust Property. The purpose of this 
Warranty Deed was to transfer title out of Arnold's name, so that he could qualify for 
Public Welfare to assist in paying for his medical expenses. In addition, a Quit Claim 
Deed ("the sibling deed"), was also signed by the remaining four children and their 
spouses conveying their interest in the Trust Property to Donald and Jeanette on March 
24, 1967. Since this time other small neighboring pieces of property have been added to 
the Trust Property in various deeds signed by Donald's siblings and most sibling spouses. 
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Arnold was the only person with a recorded interest in the Tri^ st Property prior to March 
24, 1967. The sibling deed to Donald and Jeanette was consistent with a constructive trust 
since the title was in Arnold's name. Donald's actions were not outwardly inconsistent 
with the duties of a trustee of a trust. 
Arnold's transfer of the title of the Trust Property to Efonald and Jeanette 
established a constructive trust for the family. The constructive trust created was for the 
financial benefit of Arnold, Cleo and the five children. Donald and Jeanette Rawlings 
were the trustees of the trust. Creating the constructive trust flowed Arnold to receive the 
medial treatments needed without losing the farm. 
The transfer of the Trust Property from Arnold to Donald and Jeanette did not 
constitute any type of fraud. The Welfare Department knew pf the transfer and in fact 
instructed Donald on how to effectuate the transfer. The transfer of the Trust Property to 
Donald and Jeanette was in line with Utah's public policy at that time to foster the family 
and care for the needy. The intent behind the transfer to Donald reinforces the fact that 
the transfer established a trust for the benefit of the family. 
The trust property continued to be operated in the same way after March 24, 1967, 
as it had been operating before this date. Arnold, due to his health worked less, but 
Dwayne, Bryce, and LaRell continued to help. Arnold contihued to refer to the Trust 
Property as "his farm" and Donald admitted on cross examination, that Arnold continued 
to have real property until 1970, Arnold had no real property except the Trust Property 
and the lot his home was on. Arnold passed away in 1970. Donald continued to represent 
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to his siblings that income from the trust property was being used to support their mother. 
All the siblings continued to help out on the property. 
In 1974 a property line dispute arose between the trust property and the lot owners 
of Vineyard Meadows subdivision. Donald and Jeanette, as trustees of the trust property, 
obtained a Quit Claim Deed from Donald's siblings and spouses to correct the disputed 
boundary line. Donald, Dwayne and their sons also installed a fence across portions of the 
backyard and portions of improvements in the Vineyard Meadows subdivision. In 1976 
the Fourth Judicial District Court issued a decree finding that the lot in the Vineyard 
Meadows Subdivision encroached on to the Trust Property. Donald and Jeanette got a 
monetary settlement on behalf of the Vineyard Meadows lot owners. Consistent with a 
constructive trust, Donald and Jeanette distributed portions of the monetary settlement to 
the siblings and to Cleo. 
In 1978 Donald and Janette deeded an undivided on-half interest in a lot from the 
Trust Property to Dwayne and his wife, Paulette. This lot was used as a $15,000 down 
payment on another property ("the industrial property"), with each couple paying an 
additional $15,000 in borrowed funds to purchase. Donald and Dwayne operated a 
business for a number of years at this property and each couple held title to half the 
property. The industrial property was bought for $45,000 using the Trust Property lot 
($15,000) and an additional $30,000 ($15,000 each). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants fail to marshal the evidence. "A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all the record evidence that supports the challenged findings" (Utah 
7 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9). The appellants do not marshal the evidence 
nor do they state why the evidence is lacking and erroneous. 
The evidence presented at the lower court shows that the court did not err in 
imposing a constructive trust. Constructive trusts may arise when a party will be unjustly 
enriched. They may also arise where there is no express or intplied, written or verbal 
declaration of a trust. Factors for a constructive trust such as confidential relationship 
were present. 
The court did not err in finding that the appellants claim concerning the statute of 
limitations was wrong. The court found the action was not barred but that the appellees 
had acted in a timely manner after they had received notice from the appellant. 
The court below did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions on Donald and 
Janette Rawlings for failure to mediate in good faith. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANTS FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
"The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial 
which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings are 
clearly erroneous". Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989), 
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Company, 818 P.2d 1311, 1313. 
We have shown no reluctance to affirm when the appellant fails to adequately 
marshall the evidence, "(citation omitted)" In West Valley City, Judge Orme held, "after 
marshaling the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the City must then show that 
these-same findings are 'so lacking in support as to be5 'agaihst the clear weight of the 
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evidence/ thus making them clearly erroneous." 818 P.2d 1311, 1315, citing Mountain 
States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
West Valley City had presented the Court of Appeals with a brief that contained extensive 
quotes from the record. The Court found this an inadequate marshaling and explained, 
The marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have pertinent 
excerpts from the record readily available to a reviewing court. The 
marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel 
must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing 
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 'Appellants often overlook or disregard this 
heavy burden.' Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 
(Utah App. 1989) cited in West Valley City, 818P.2d 1311, 1315. 
The court explained that while in this appeal there was a "general catalogue of 
evidence. What the City has not done is to correlate particular items of evidence with the 
challenged findings and convince us of the court's missteps in application of the evidence 
to its findings." Id. Because of this, the Court of Appeals could not find the findings of 
facts to be clearly erroneous. wCThe challenge to the legal conclusions rises and falls with 
the factual findings sought to be challenged." Id. 
Appellants' Brief fails in this regard. Appellants have not marshaled the evidence. 
The appellants argue that the third party plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence that a 
confidential relationship existed between the grantor, Arnold J. Rawlings (Appellants) 
and grantees. While Appellants outline what occurred, they do not become the devil's 
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advocate. The Appellants do not show the Appellees' argument and evidence and then 
ferret out flaws in the same argument and evidence, showing against the clear weight of 
the evidence why it is clearly erroneous. 
Appellants argue there was insufficient evidence offered at trial to meet third party 
plaintiffs' burden of proof. Appellants argue that plaintiffs' claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations, and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions. 
In all these areas the appellants do not marshal the evidence $nd show that there was 
insufficient evidence, or why the claim should be barred by the statute of limitations or 
how the court imposed sanctions was abuse. 
This review of the findings of fact is controlled by rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The Supreme Court of Utah in 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, (UT 1988) said, "To mount a successful challenge 
to trial court findings under that rule, an appellant must marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings. Only then can we determine whether those findings are clearly 
erroneous." Id at 922. When an appellant fails to do this "th£ trial court's determination 
will not be disturbed." Id. 
Because the appellants have failed to marshal the facts this court should deny their 
appeal. 
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POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN IMPOSING A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST. 
The question is raised by the appellant as to whether a constructive trust was 
created when the father, Arnold, stricken with cancer and the fear of losing his farm to 
medical bills, conveyed the Trust Property at issue to his oldest son, Donald, and his wife 
Jeanette. At the same time, Donald had his siblings sign a Quit Claim Deed in favor of 
Donald and Jeanette as grantees of the Trust Property. After Arnold's death, Cleo 
continued to receive support from monies obtained from the Trust Property, including 
fruit from the orchard which was harvested by the family. Third Party Plaintiffs believed 
that Donald and Jeanette were the trustees of the trust. Donald and Jeanette allowed this 
belief to stand. Donald told his siblings the money from the Trust Properly was 
supporting Cleo. He delivered some of those funds to Cleo and his siblings. Donald now 
claims that there was no trust and that the property was his outright because he allegedly 
paid off his father's mortgage which Donald and Jeanette claim had been in foreclosure in 
December of 1966. No evidence of a foreclosure was presented to the trial court and 
neither Donald nor Jeanette testified the reason for Arnold deeding the trust property to 
them was because they had paid off the mortgage. Donald also claims Arnold was behind 
on real estate taxes assessed by Utah County on the trust property. Of the $1,267.00 in 
real estate taxes paid on the trust property on March 24, 1967, Dwayne had delivered 
$1,000.00 to Donald in January 1967, for real estate tax payment. Evidence was given 
that Arnold was afraid of losing the property to pay for expensive medical bills and that 
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the Utah County Department of Public Welfare had presented transferring of the property 
as a way to protect the property. 
A constructive trust is a relationship with respect to property 
subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held to an 
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that his acquisition or 
retention of the property is wrongful and that he would be unjustly enriched 
if he were permitted to retain the property." See Restatement of Restitution, 
§ 160, Restatement of the Law Second Trusts 2d. Vol. 1, §§ 1-260, pg. 5, 
American Law Institute, 1959. American Law Institute Publishers. 
In this case allowing Donald and Jeanette to keep the JTrust Property would allow 
Donald and Jeanette to be unjustly enriched. Donald and Jeanette argue the Trust Property 
was theirs and there was no mention of a trust between them and Arnold. Arnold could 
have created an express trust but "only if the settler manifest^ an intention to create it." Id. 
at §23. Donald's, Jeanette5s and Arnold's actions, up to the <^ eath of Arnold, make it 
appear that no express trust was created as Arnold continued to run the Trust Property as 
a farm and receive all the Trust Property income.. 
Donald and Jeanette also claim there is no trust because there is no signed 
document. In the case of Haws et al v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 216 the court stated that, 
Under certain circumstances existing at the time a conveyance a trust is 
made, no writing evidencing an intent to create a trust is required. In those 
instances, equity will impress a constructive trust upon the property in favor 
of the person or persons designated by the grantor as the beneficiary or 
beneficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive trust, being an equitable 
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law and is not 
within the statute of frauds. 
Therefore "a constructive trust is imposed, not to effeictuate intention, but to 
redress wrong or unjust enrichment. A constructive trust is remedial in character." 
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Restatement of Restitution, § 160, Restatement of the Law Second Trusts 2d. Vol. 1, §§ 1-
260, pg. 5, American Law Institute, 1959. American Law Institute Publishers. A 
constructive trust is also equitable in nature. "Since a constructive trust is an equitable 
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, it arises by operation of law, and is not within the 
statue of frauds." Haws, 116 Utah 212, 216 (1949); see also In re Estate of Hock, 655 
P.2d 1111,1114 (Utah 1982); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710, (Utah 
1977). 
Donald and Jeanette also claim there can be no constructive trust as there was no 
confidential relationship with the grantor. The court in Parks v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 
673 P.2d 590 (Utah 1983) state that, "A constructive trust may be imposed if the grantee 
was in a confidential relationship with the grantor. w Where a confidential relationship 
exists, a presumption of unfairness arises . . . and the burden shifts to the defendant to 
prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence.'" citing Baker v. Pattee, 
684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984). Donald was Arnold's oldest son. Donald was the family 
member in communication with the Welfare Department. Donald was the family member 
entrusted with the delivery of the real estate tax payments to Utah County. Donald lived 
on a lot carved out of the family farm, in near proximity to Arnold and Cleo. Donald's 
attorney drafted the deed creating the constructive trust. Therefore the burden shifts to 
Donald and Jeanette. 
In George Gleason Bogert's The Law of Trusts and Trustees, Revised Second 
Edition § 471-510, 280 (West 1978), Bogert states," A fiduciary or confidential 
relationship may exist where trust and confidence are reposed by one person in another, 
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who, as a result, gains an influence and superiority over the first." see Duncan v. Dazey, 
1925, 149 N.E. 505 (IL). The Utah Supreme Court mNewell\v. Halloran, 68 Utah 407, 
413 (1926) discussed the issue of influence in a contract concerning a land lease. The 
Court stated, 
The doctrine rests upon the principle of inequality between the 
parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the parties 
over the other. Mere confidence in one person by another is not sufficient 
alone to constitute a fiduciary relationship. The confidence must be reposed 
by one under such circumstances as to create a corresponding duty, either 
legal or moral, upon the part of the other to observe the confidence, and it 
must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there is superior 
influence on one side and dependence on the other. 
Donald was in a position to exert influence on his father. Donald was the oldest 
son. Arnold, Donald's father, was ill. Also, Arnold was con0erned about losing his farm 
because of his illness and its associated costs. A Michigan case is similar and involved 
family members. 
To avoid foreclosure plaintiff conveyed property to defendant under 
an agreement whereby defendant would make contract installment 
payments and pay taxes and insurance. The court ruled that defendant held 
the proceeds from the sale of the property under a constructive trust since 
the conveyance had been only to vest legal title in defendant until plaintiffs 
financial situation improved." Chapman v. Chapman, 1971, 188 N. W.2d 
21, 31 Mich. App., 576, cited as footnote 69 in The Law of Trusts and 
Trustees, George Gleason Bogert, Revised Second Edition Sections 471-
510, pg. 327, West Publishing Co. (1978), 
In the case of Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 217 (Utah 1949) A mother left her 
home to her daughter and there were no written documents. The daughter later married 
and then passed away and the husband took the house. The family sued claiming the 
14 
house had been left to the daughter to be held in trust for the family therefore the husband 
could not inherit the home. The court stated, 
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers in inter vivos to 
another in trust for a third person, but no memorandum properly evidencing 
the intention to create a trust is signed, and the transferee refuses to perform 
the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust for the 
third person, if, but only if, (a) * * * (b) the transferee at the time of the 
transfer was in a confidential relation to the transferor, or (c) * * * 
The defendant in the Haws case also alleged, as Donald and Jeanette do, that there 
was no confidential relationship between the mother and daughter. The court found that 
the property was conveyed with the intent that the daughter, 
hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family. Implicit in this 
allegation is that Mrs. Haws reposed confidence in Amber; otherwise, Mrs. 
Haws would have not made the conveyance. Thus this allegation along with 
the fact that the grantor and grantee were mother and daughter, which 
appears on the face of the complaint, is a sufficient allegation of a 
confidential relation. 
These facts parallel the facts in this case. Carol, Bryce, LaRell and Dwayne 
were all told that the March 24, 1967, conveyance to Donald and Jeanette was 
because Arnold had to get the trust property out of Arnold's name as required by 
the Welfare Department. Arnold signed this deed only to make a temporary 
transfer, with Cleo and the five (5) children to receive thereafter their expected 
shares of the Trust Property. 
The court then cited Scott on Trust, Vol. I, § 44.2, which states, 
A constructive trust is imposed even if there is no fiduciary relationship 
such as that between attorney and client, principal and agent, trustee and 
beneficiary; it is sufficient that there is a family relationship or other 
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personal relationship of such a character that the transferor is justified in 
believing that the transferee will act in his interest. 
The court in Blodgett v. Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (1978) again states that 
"There are a few relationships (such as parent-child, attorney-client, trustee-cestui) which 
the law presumes to be confidential." When it is found the parties are in a confidential 
relationship the "the plaintiffs burden is considerably diminished." Id. 
Because the court did not err in finding a constructive trust, the court should deny 
the appellants appeal. 
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM FOR 
A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WAS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965) the Court of Appeals set forth 
the rules governing the timing of the statute of limitations ai}d laches regarding the 
repudiation of a trustee as follows, 
Defendant's invocation of the statute of limitations and laches runs 
counter to the rule that such a defense is not available to a trustee as against 
his beneficiaries until something has occurred to give a clear indication to 
them that he has repudiated his trust [footnote omitted]; or the 
circumstances are such that they must be charged with knowledge of such 
repudiation [footnote omitted]. No such situation existed here. But there are 
several factors which tend to support the trial court's determination. Where 
a near relative is involved courts are less inclined to find a repudiation. This 
is so because of the greater likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed 
confidence in him; and also, they would have a natural reluctance to sue 
him unless circumstances force them to do so. Id. at 258. 
While there was no written documentation in this case as there was in the Walker 
case, the proposition remains that in a close family setting, the sibling beneficiaries need 
something more to believe that a trust had been repudiated. In the Rawling's case, Cleo 
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has been partially provided for by the family members' efforts in harvesting an orchard 
on the property, Cleo and the third party plaintiffs had received portions of settlement 
proceeds, and the family was allowed to live on, visit, and enjoy the property. Similarly, 
the Court of Appeals in the Walker case stated, 
Under the facts shown there wouldn't be anything strange or 
unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming, as they did, that the defendant 
was holding the property for the family until after the death of their mother, 
so that she would be provided with a home; and that after her death, their 
father's estate would be settled and each would receive his share. These 
considerations, taken together with the fact that some members of the 
family remained in the property, make the refusal of the trial court to apply 
laches against the plaintiffs harmonize with the reason. Id. at 257. 
A compelling act is needed to signify that the trustee has repudiated his trust which 
would then invoke the running of the statute of limitations, laches, or that the trustee was 
acting adverse to the constructive trust for purposes of adverse possession. "Statues of 
limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 33 citing, Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 
1235, 1236 (Utah 1998) wTn certain instances, however, the discovery rule tolls the 
limitation period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered. Id. 
914 P.2d at 50-51/' Here the discovery rule applies, 
(1) In situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in 
situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the 
application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of 
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of 
action. 
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Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) (footnote citations 
omitted). 
In the case of Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262 (Utah 2000), a father had sold to one of 
his children a residence that was part of a trust for which he ^as the trustee. A second 
child later sued claiming the father had no right to sell property that he should be holding 
in trust. The question before the court was when the second child had notice of the 
breach. The Supreme Court of Utah held that the four year p0riod in § 78-12-25 of the 
Utah Code Annotated, had run and the action was barred. The court clarified what it felt 
was an ambiguity in the law concerning when a statute of lirriitations would begin to run. 
In Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965) zn&Acott v. Tomlinson, 337 P.2d 
720, 724 (Utah 1959) it had held "a statute of limitation period will not begin to run until 
the beneficiary knows or through reasonable investigation could have learned of a breach 
or a repudiation." Snow 998 P.2d 262, 266. 
The Supreme Court of Utah clarified that this "special 'trust5 statute of limitations 
rule is a version of the discovery rule." Id. The Court stated that in these areas where a 
trustee is sued by a beneficiary claiming violations of trust "exceptional circumstances" 
were at hand. Id. Therefore "a rigid application of the statute of limitations may be 
'irrational and unjust/ and thus make the discovery rule available." Id. citing Warren v. 
Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). So the Court protected the "interests 
of a beneficiary by applying the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the 
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged breach or repudiation. Snow 998 P.2d 
262, 266. 
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Because the court did not err in finding that the claim for a constructive trust was 
not barred by the statute of limitations the appellants appeal should be denied. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
IMPOSING SANCTIONS. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions. Concerning the 
imposed sanctions arising from the Appellants' failure to mediate in good faith, the 
Appellant's brief does not even state what the sanctions were or why they were imposed 
other than bad faith. The trial court found "that Donald and Jeanette came to the 
mediation with a fully formed intention not to participate in the mediation in good faith 
and had determined that they would not be prepared to discuss all relevant issues in this 
case". (Order Granting Motion for Sanctions for Payment of Mediator's Fees, and for 
Attorney's Fees of Opposing Counsel). Under Rule 101 (h), Utah Rules of Court-
Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution the court may order absent parties to show cause 
why they failed to attend the mediation conference and, if appropriate, why sanctions 
should not be imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's appeal should be denied. Appellants failed to marshal the 
evidence and because they failed to marshal they are then unable to demonstrate why the 
findings would be erroneous. The trial court did not err in imposing a constructive trust in 
this case. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial for the judge to find that a 
constructive trust had been created by Arnold when he signed a Warranty Deed to Donald 
and his wife Jeanette. Constructive trusts are created in equity for the purpose of working 
out justice in the most efficient manner. The court did not err in finding that the claim for 
a constructive trust was not barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations 
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will not begin to run where there is a constructive trust until liotice is given to the other 
party. The court correctly found that the Third-Party Plaintiffs did act within the time 
limits allowed after they received notice that Donald was acting in a manner inconsistent 
with that of a trustee. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by imposing 
sanctions on Donald for a lack of good faith during the court ordered mediation. 
Appellants brief does not give enough information about the ordered mediation for the 
Court of Appeals to make this determination. 
The judgment entered by the lower court in favor of the Appellees should stand. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of1 April, 2008. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
'W&d/JJ* 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellees 
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